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INTRODUCTION
In this post-modern era, religion has been experiencing a
worldwide transformation. Some see a resurgence of traditional
religion, including Islam, evidenced by an increase in renewed
religious rituals and practices in countries of varying levels of
economic development, political structures, and religious
traditions including those of North America, the Middle East,
Asia, and Africa.1 Others do not agree entirely. An emphasis on
Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. Copyright @c 2013, Nina J.
Crimm.
1. See, e.g., John L. Esposito, Religion and Global Affairs: Political Challenges, 18 SAIS
REV. 19 (1998); Scott M. Thomas, A Globalized God Subtitle: Religion's Goawingfluence on
International Politics, 89 FOREIGN AFF. 93 (2010); see generally VOICES OF RESURGENT
ISLAM (John L. Esposito ed., 1983).
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conservative religious beliefs and practices has declined in many
industrialized, rich countries, with the United States as one
prominent exception.4 Yet, most analysts appear to agree that
developing countries in the Southern regions of the world are
increasingly populated by individuals holding conservative
religious beliefs) Moreover, "there are more people alive today
with traditional religious beliefs than ever before in history, and
they're a larger percentage of the world's population than they
were 20 years ago."b Many think that morality-based values, if not
religious precepts (Islamic, Catholic, Protestant), in all parts of
the world have become more relevant to, if not a significant
influence on, ideological, social, economic, and political issues.7
These alterations are tied directly to globalization by which
the world is experiencing a "'historically unique increase of scale
to a global interdependency among people and nations' . . .
2. See, e.g, OLIVER ROY, 1-IOiY IGNORANCE: WHEN RELIGION AN) CULTURE PART
WAYS 3 (2010) (arguing that there are new forms of religious visibility rather than an
outbreak of religiousness"); World Values Surey, Is There A Global Resurgence of
Religion ?, PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE (May 8, 2006),
http://www.pewforui.org/Politics-and-Elections/Is-There-a-Global-Resurgence-of-
Religion.aspx [hereinafter Global Resurgence ofReligion].
3. Global Resurgence of Religion, supra note 2 (statement of Ronald Inglehart,
Chairman, at the National Press Club, Washington, D.C.). There also has been an
emphasis on secularism in many of these countries, particularly in such European
countries as France. PEW FORU NI ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE, AN UNCERTAIN ROAD:
MU iSLIMS AN) THE FUTURE OF EUROPE 1 (2005), available at
http://ww.pewforui.org/Muslim/An-Uncertain-Road-Muslims-and-the-Futuire-of-
Europe.aspx.
4. The revival of traditional religious beliefs was on prominent display during the
2010 congressional elections. Similarly, Christian evangelicals among othier religious
adherents actively and visibly participated during the 2012 presidential electoral
season.
5. Thomas, supra note 1, at 93 (identifying contributing factors to the trend. such
as current population shifts and high fertility rates of youthful populations in
developing countries); see also U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., The
World at Six Billion, at Part 2. Tables 2-4. U.N. Doc. ESA/P/WP.154 (1999). In 1900,
just under one-third of the wvorld population resided in Europe, North America, and
Latin America, but by 1999, only about twenty-five percent resided in thc more
developed regions of the world. Linking Population, Poverty and Development: Rapid
Growth in Less Developed Regions, U.N. POPULATION FUND, http://www.unfpa.org/pds/
trends.htm (last visited Dec. 2. 2012).
6. Global Resurgence of Religion, supra note 2.
7. See. e.g., id. ("In this broader sense, spiritual concerns are growving, not
shrinking, and a different kind of religion may be playing a bigger role ... thc politics,
even of advanced industrial societics, is shifting to one in which [rcligious] issues are
more relevant and value questions are much more central.").
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characteri[z]ed by (1) rapid integration of the world economy,
(2) innovations and growth in international electronic
communications and (3) increasing 'political and cultural
awareness of the global interdependency of humanity."'" Those
interconnected attributes have presented opportunities for
individuals and nations to reconsider their identities and
renegotiate their relationships. All people are forced to realize
that the continuing process of globalization is depicted by
polarities. It intensely accentuates both individuality and
pluralism, powerfully implicates political, economic, and social
dependency as well as autonomy, and strongly challenges
models of democratic, secular governance and society adopted
by many western, industrialized nations but eschewed by
autocratic theocracies, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The
centrifugal force of globalization, with its "temporal and spatial
dimensions of planetwide human interaction," 9 inexorably
causes tensions. Simultaneously it emphasizes commonalities
and distinctions, stabilizes and destabilizes, and unifies, as well as
divides, groups, societies, and countries.10
For the large number of Islamic believers, post-modern
globalization engages them rather than denies their relevance.I
8. Jeffrey Haynes, Democratisation in the Middle East and North Africa: Wh7at is the
Effect of Globalisation?, 11 ITOTAIITARIAN MNIOVEMENTS & POL. RE1IGTONS 133, 134
(2010). As Thomas L. Friedman similarly writes, globalization is characterized by
integration. the Web, and a homogenization, and "is the inexorable intcgration of
markets, nation-states and technologies to a degree never witnessed before-in a way
that is enabling individuals, corporation and nation-statcs to reach around the world
farther, faster, deeper and cheaper than ever before." THONLAS L. FRILDIAN, THE
1.EXUS AND THE 0IVWE TREE 8-9 (2000).
9. Richard L. Harris, The Global Context of Contemporary Latin American Affairs, in
CAPITAL, POWER, AND INEQUALITY IN LATIN AiMLRICA 279-80 (S. Halcbsky & R. L. Harris
eds., 1995).
10. For example, globalization offers opportunities to circulate information on
such matters as westernizcd ideals of human rights. Such pcrspctives, however. can
unite people, groups, and countries sharing or aspiring to those ideals, while creating
rifts among others.
11. See Mahmood Ahmad, Religious Resurgence in an Era of Globalization: Islam's
Quest fir Global Paricipation (2005), http://globalization.icaap.org/content/v5.2/
ahmad.htil ("Globalization actually engages Islam rathcr than denying its
relevance ... [w]ithin the new public spaces created by globalization, religious
identities interact with modern ideas and technologies."); Interview byI Frontline with
Amina Wadud, Professor of Islamic Studies, Va. Commonwealth Univ., in Richmond,
Va. (Mar. 2002), available at IIp://ww.phs.org/ wgbi/pagcs/frontlil/shows/
muslims/interviews/wadud.html [hereinafter Amina Wadud Interview] (" [T]he more
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It presents a time when they are challenged by technology,
capitalistic economic structures, democratic and other political
regimes, and human rights systems. In response, they endeavor
to "psycho-spiritually" reconfigure themselves. 1 The
reformation is a form of an Islamic resurgence through a
process of "re-establish [ing] Islamic values, Islamic practices,
Islamic institutions, Islamic laws, indeed Islam in its
entirety ... re-creat[ing] an Islamic ethos, an Islamic social
order, at the vortex of which is the Islamic human being, guided
by the Qur'an and the Sunnah [original Islamic sources]."' A
spectrum of Islamic believers, ranging from moderate reformers
to radical extremists, is involved in this religious-socio-political
awakening. Thus, the "renaissance of Islam and its ethos in all
sectors of Muslim societies, from culture and political life to
private beliefs and civic networks of faith,"14 is bound to have
tremendous consequences for the global world.
As part of the revival, Islamic believers harness
contemporary technologies-computers, cell phones, audio and
video tapes, radio, television, the Internet including Twitter and
social networking sites, modern transportation, and the like-to
disseminate broadly religious-socio-political messages, organize
and mobilize mass support, electronically transfer funds, and
move physically within a country and trans-nationally. Indeed,
during the first decade of the twenty-first century Islamic
extremists, such as Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda militants, and
other fundamentalists, actively used such technologies to plan,
fund, orchestrate, and carry out numerous Islamic-socio-political
campaigns against the West. Without exception, such
technologies were integral to the planning and execution of the
September 11, 2001 attacks that sought to destroy symbols of US
financial, military, and political power. They also were used in
the bombings on July 7, 2005 in London and on March 11, 2004
in Madrid.
recent manifestations of Islanic resurgence is very intimately tied to the
reconfigurations of identity, not only among Muslims, but across others.").
12. Anina Wadud Interview, supra note 11.
13. RIFKI ROSYAD. A QUEST FOR TRUE ILSLAM: A STUDY OF THE ISLAMIC RESURGLNCE
MOVEMENT AMONG THE YOUTH OF BAND UNG, INDONESIA, 9-10 (1995).
14. Anhad, supra note 11.
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With the unfolding of the twenty-first century's second
decade, internationally there already is a new wave of Islamic
sociopolitical activism. These outpourings were partly spurred by
the confluence of technology, Islam's resurgence, and politics as
facets of globalization. Most prominent are the Arab Spring
uprisings that emerged as major "bottom-up" attempts to
democratize various Muslim countries suffering under
authoritarian rule, such as Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria.
These revolts were enabled by various technologies, such as
Twitter, and then viewed worldwide on television and the
Internet. Protestors received support from foreign individuals
and countries, including the United States, if not financially at
least ideologically. In Egypt, the uprisings have already led to a
democratically elected government. In January 2012, the Muslim
Brotherhood, described as "combin [ing] revivalist Islam and
Arab sympathies with modern technology, organization, and
communications," 15 won approximately half of the seats in
Egypt's Parliament. Then, despite opposition from Egypt's
military and young Arab Spring revolutionaries, in June 2012,
voters elected Mohammed Morsi, a member of the Muslim
Brotherhood, as Egypt's president. And in Tunisia, Said Fejani,
of the Islamist party Ennahda, now governs.' 7
Islamic sociopolitical activism impelled by technologies in
the second decade of the twenty-first century is not reserved for
foreign realms. On the domestic front, US policymakers are
considering a dramatic shift in US foreign policy in response to
the Muslim Brotherhood's new political power. As suggested in
Parts 1, 11 and III of this Article, such a change, along with other
conditions-some seemingly stagnant and others rapidly
evolving-might newly spur Muslim Americans, their leaders,
and the charitable sector to mobilize for modifications to post-
9/11 domestic policies, laws, and government actions. These
modifications would address the policies that problematically
have alienated many Muslim Americans, chilled Muslim
Americans' philanthropy, hurt US-based Islamic charities, and
15. Neil Munro, American Muslims. Reformers v. Reivalsts NAT'LJ.,July 31, 2010.
16. David D. Kirkpatrik, Ilamist Win 70% of Seats in th Egyptian Palament, NY
TIMLS, Jan. 22, 2012, atA8 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick. Islamists Win].
17. Alhony Shadid, Exile Over, Tunisian Sets Task: Building a Democracy, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 18, 2012, at Al.
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blocked aid to needy Muslims abroad, tarnishing the reputation
of the United States as a result. Assisted by contemporary
communicative technologies, new Islamic sociopolitical activism
in the United States could bring not only domestic and
worldwide attention to these injuries, but also improvements
and perhaps even remedies.
1. REPERCUSSIONS REALIZED IN THE FIRST DECADE OF THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
Before September 11, 2001, Muslim Americans rather easily
tithed the Qur'anic mandated zakat I" (in accord with the
Hadiths, considered indispensable to Islamic believers' spiritual
self-purification and essential for Allah to accept prayers),D or
gave the Qur'anic recommended voluntary beneficence of
sadaqa,2o to needy Muslims,2 even those situated overseas. These
18. Generally zakat is a duty to tithe 2.5% of wealth, which is historically paid as a
tax. See AMY SINGER, CHARITYIN ISLAMIC SOCIETY 35-44 (2008); see also Nina J. Crirnm,
MWuslim-Americans' Charitable Giving Dilemma: What About a Centralized Terror-Free Donor
Advised Fund, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L REV. 375, 377 (2008) [hereinafter Crimrn,
Charitable Giving Dilemma]. Yet. Shia Muslims are obligated to tithe twenty percent of
their income beyond living expenses. See KHALIL JASSLMM, ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON
CHARITY 19 (2006).
19. See Crinmm, Charitable Giving Dilemma, supra note 18. at 377.
20. See SINGER, supra note 18, at 18; see also Crimin. Charitable Giving Dilemma,
supra note 18, at 378 (explaining that the Qur'an suggests sadaqa should be given
anonymously or discrectly). Sadaqa is given to aid the poor, to assist the incapacitated,
to support social services, and to help other worthy recipients and causes. See Azini
Nanji, Charitable Giving in Islam, 5 ANLLIANCE 1 (2000), available at
http://www.islami.co.za/awqafsa/sorclc/ibrary/Artick%209.htm; Imam Ghazaali,
Sadaqa-Giving in Charity, UNITED WELFARE TRUST. www.uwt.org/site/artidce.asp?
id= 170 (last visited Mar. 2, 2010).
21. In addition to the collector of zakat, the Qur'an enumeirates seven categories
of peoplc religiously sanctified and thus entitled to receive zakat the poor, the
deprived, the destitute, the homeless, the sick, the wayfarer, and others who are in
need of help. See SINGER, supra note 18, at 44; see also KHAIL JASSEMM, ISLAMIC
PLRSPIECTJ\ ON CHARITY 77 (2006); Neil MacFarquhar, Fears of Inquiry Dampen Giving
by U.S MuSlims, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2006, at Al; Day to Day Show: Auslims Concerned
About Donations, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (July 26, 2007), http://www npr.org/templates/
transcript/transcript.php'storylId12255939. Today there is widespread belief among
Muslims that, according to the prophet Muhammad, the world's neediest Muslims
should be the rccipicnts of obligatoly zakat contributions. See Damien Henderson,
Shaking the Pillars ofIslam, HElRLD (Glasgow), Dec. 7, 2004. at A12. Nonetheless. the
categories of zaat recipients "turn [] out to be broad and flexible, perhaps
intentionally so" SINGER, supra not 18, at 44.
During the Ottonan Empire, a determination of who constituted needy Muslims
was not based entirely on economic need but rather on individuals' social classiication,
606 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 36:600
forms of charity could be transmitted abroad relatively
effortlessly by Muslim Americans by utilizing various approaches.
Unregulated private conduits and informal means, such as
couriers and hawalas,22 were commonly used, as were more
formal channels, including local mosques and US-based Muslim
charities. Yet, in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, US and
foreign political policymakers reacted powerfully. They quickly
and dramatically shifted US foreign policy, enhanced laws, and
expanded regulatory authority of government agencies. These
reactions had enormous consequences on well-intentioned
Muslim Americans and their ability to fulfill their zakat duty or
give sadaqa to even the most destitute Muslims.
Within days of the 9/11 attacks, President George W. Bush
announced that the US government would mount a
governmental financial war against terrorism, 2 which some
criticized as having "the appearance of a war on Islam.'24 Widely
commented upon elsewhere by myself and others, Congress
enacted a series of new legislation, one piece of which is
popularly known as the USA PATRIOT Act, that significantly
expanded presidential powers and delegations existing under
the International Emergency and Economic Powers Act
such as scholars, mosque employees, and students. See id. at 185. With modernization
and the rise of the welfare state, new and shifting attitudes influenced the Muslim sense
of responsibility, with relice support, and care of the poor decined especially
important. Id. at 196-200. The welfare state reinforced the idea that the poor had a just
claim on zakat and buttressed zakat as fundamental to Islamic moral thought and
economic outlook. Id. at 203.
22. The hawala system is an informal, paperless, and networked mnoncy transfer
system ("hawala" means "trust") used by Muslims throughout the world, including the
United States. Alan Lambert, Underground Banking and Financing of Terrorism, in
Organized Crime, Terrorism, and Aoney Launderin in the Americas, 15 FLA. J. INT'L L. 9,
12-15 (2002). A party pays cash to another person who adv anc es the equivalent funds
to, or on behalf of, another designated party for a specified use abroad. Id. at 14-15.
Thus, no official bank recor ds are maintained, and the funds cannot be tracked by
governmental authorities absent additional regulations. See Nina J. Crimm, The Moral
Hazards of Anti-Terrorism Financing Measures: A Potential to Compromise Civil Societies and
National Interests, 43 WV.AKE FORLST L. RLV. 577, 583 n.22 (2008) [hereinafter Crimm,
MWoral Hazards ofjFinancing Weasures].
23. See President's Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the United
States Response to the Tcrrorist Attacks of September 11. 2 PUB. PAPERS 1140. 1142
(Sept. 20, 200 1). See also Crimrn, Charitable Giving Dilemma, supra note 18, at 204.
24. ACLU, BLOCKING FAITH, FREEZING CHARITY: CHILLING MUSLIM CHARITABLE
GIVING IN THE "WAR ON TERRORISM FINANCING" 16 (2009) [hereinafter ACLU
REPORT].
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("IEEPA").25 This legislation strengthened money laundering,
tax, racketeering, and other antiterrorism laws, including those
aimed at individuals and domestic publicly-supported charities
and private foundations that assist, support, or sponsor
terrorism or terrorist organizations, financially, or otherwise.26
The Government vigorously enforced these
counterterrorism measures. By 2009, the federal government
had investigated and prosecuted individuals for allegedly
"knowingly"27 providing material support to foreign terrorist
25. See, e.g., Nina J. Crimin, Post-September 11 Fortified Anti-Terrorism Aleasures
Compel Heightened Due Diligence, 25 PACE L REV. 203, 205-13 (2005) [hereinafter
Crinin, Heightened Due Diligence]; see generally Nina J. Crimn, High Alert: The
Governments War on the Financing of Terrorism and Its Implications for Donors, Domestic
Charitable Organizations, and Global Philanthopy, 45 WM. & MARY I REV. 1341 (2004)
[hereinafter Criimni High Alert].
26. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, 115 Stat. 272 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code),
appreciably enlarging presidential powers contained in the International Emergency
and Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), Pub. L No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977) (codified
at 50 U.S.C. 1701-1707 (2006)), and strengthening federal criminal and civil statutes
including 18 U.S.C. 2339A, 2339B (2006); see Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism Convention Implementation Act of 2002, Pub. L No. 107-197, § 202(a), 116
Stat. 724 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339C (Supp. V 2005)) (implementing a
United Nations convention signed by the United States in 2000 and adding a new
counter-terrorism statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339C, to reach fitndraising, the collection of
funds, and other financial transactions that further terrorist activitics); Military Family
Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, § 108, 117 Stat. 1335, 1339 (2003)
(codilied as amended in scattered section of U.S. Code Section 26) (adding I.R.C.
501(p) that denies tax-exempt status cligibility to a specially designated global terrorist
entity, a designated foreign terrorist organization, or an identified supporting
organization of terrorism and enabling the Internal Revenue Service to suspend the
tax-exempt status of any such existing organization without an opportunity for prior
challenge). For further discussion of these fortified measures, see generally Crinim,
Heightened Due Diligence, supra note 25; see also Crimm, High Alert, supra note 25, at
1354-58. 1394-97, 1404-26.
27. The level of intent required to be subject to 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, which
criminalizes "material support" of terrorists, was not clear when the statute was enacted
originally. As Congress considered the enactment of the USA PATRIOT Act, in
questions to Attorney General Ashcroft, it addressed the level of intent that should be
required under § 23391. Mr. Ashcroft responded, "we think the standards should be
actual knowledge or should have known. That's a pretty high standard, but we don't
want peoplc to be responsible if they actually thought they were giving-appropriately
thought they were giving to a charity." Admin istration's Draft Anti- Terrorism Act of 2001:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciar, 107th Cong. 25 (2001) (Statement of John
Ashcroft. Att'y Gen. of the United States), available at http://commidocs.house.gov/
committees/ jidiciar/hjut75288.000/hju75288_0f.htm.
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organizations.2 8 It also aggressively pursued US-based Islamic
charities, visibly placed some "under investigation," designated
several as specially designated global terrorists, froze their
tangible and intangible assets," and suspended their tax-exempt
status. s These actions crippled numerous Muslim-American
organizations, and left few mainstream US-based Islamic
charities, including those chiefly dedicated to humanitarian
relief aid for Muslims in foreign countries affected by such
natural catastrophes as tsunamis, earthquakes, and floods.)1
In the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 6603, 118 Stat.
3761, 3762-64 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.), Congress
clarified the mcntal state necessary to violate 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, requiring knowledge
of a foreign group's designation as a terrorist organization or the group's commission
of terrorist acts.
28. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, 2339B (2012). Congress intended only donors who
"knowingly" supply foreign terrorist groups financial support, even money meant for
purely humanitarian purposes, be subject to the criminal sanctions of § 23391. See, (.g.,
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. CL. 2705, 2725-26 (2010) ("Money is
fungible, and ' [w]hen foreign terrorist organizations that have a dual structure raise
funds, they highlight the civilian and humanitarian ends to which such moneys could
be put.' But 'there is reason to believe that foreign terrorist organizations do not
maintain lkgitimate financial firewalls between those funds raised for civil, nonviolent
activities, and those ultimately used to support violent, terrorist operations.'" (internal
citations omitted)); Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1146
(C.D. Cal. 2005) (explaining a congressional concern that "under the cloak of a
humanitarian or charitable exercise" terrorist organizations would receive funding)
(quoting H.R. Rep. 104-383, at *43 (1995)), aff'd. 509 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2007), opinion
amended, 552 F.3d 916 (2009), affd in part, rev'd in part. 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010).
29. 50 U.S.C. § 1702(a) (2008); 3 U.S.C. § 301 (2006); 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2006).
Betwccn September 2001 and April 2010, the total amount of US-bascd charities' funds
blocked by the US gov rnment was a paltry USS3.2 million. Anti-Money Laundering:
Blocking Terrorist Finani ng and Its Impact on Lawfal Charities: Hearing Bejore Subconm. on
Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Finan. Servs., 111th Cong. 5-7 (2010)
[hereinafter Anti-Money Laundering Hearing] (statement of Daniel L. Glaser, Deputy
Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Treasury), available at http://financialserv ices.house.gov/
Media/file/hearings/111/Printed%20Hearings/111-141.pdf. Among the US charties
that had their assets frozen, with the reccnt notable exception of KindHcarts, few have
been de-listed as specially designated global terrorist organizations and permitted to
distribute their asscts for humanitarian purposes. See Press Relcase, Am. Civil Liberties
Union, Government SettlCs Charity's Lawsuit Over Unconstitutional Terrorism Probe
(May 1, 2012).
30. I.R.C. 5 01 (p) (2006). For a discussion of the government's various actions,
see ACLU RLPORT, supra note 24, at 7-13; Crimm, Charitable Giving Dilemma, supra notc
18, at 388-89; Crimm, Heightened Due Diligence, supra note 25, at 214-15.
31. Indeed, Muslim-Anricans' philanthropy for humanitarian and development
aid for the benefit of needy Muslims abroad declined significantly without a
commensiurate expansion of their giving to US-based secular charities. See ACLU
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As an American Civil Liberties Union report in 2009
summarized, the government's legislation, policies, and conduct
alienated Muslim-Americans; injured America's reputation and
diplomatic efforts in Muslim countries; induced Muslim
Americans' fear of charitable giving through mosques and other
domestic Muslim institutions; and chilled overseas
humanitarian aid efforts.3"2 US decision-makers' political and
regulatory responses impinged on individuals' civil liberties,
circumscribed freedoms of nongovernmental actors and civil
society structures, and thus negatively impacted the welfare of
many people and institutions.
Daniel L. Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Terrorist
Financing and Financial Crimes at the US Department of
Treasury testified at a hearing before the House Committee on
Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations in May 2010, that the government "understands
the importance of charitable giving, both at home and abroad,
and seeks to encourage charitable giving while also protecting
charities from terrorist abuse or exploitation." " In support, he
briefly outlined various outreach attempts by the Treasury to the
US charitable sector and Muslim Americans. These included
meetings and collaborative projects with specific Arab and
Muslim American communities, efforts to update, amend, and
add to Treasurys Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary
Best Practices for US-Based Charities, and the development of a
"strategic partnership" with "Arab and Muslim American
REPORT, supra note 24, at 105-08 (commenting that religious scholars and followers of
Islam reason that pursuant to the Qur'an "a Muslim could not discharge her Zakat
obligation by donating to a secular charity or a non-Muslim faith-based charity," and
the US government's freezing funds of Muslim-Ameirican charities is viewed as
preventing zakat from reaching donors' intended recipients, frustrating and violating
Qulranic rights of the contributors and the rightful donces); see also Laila Al-Marayati,
American Muslim Charities: Easy Targets in the War on Terro. 25 PACE L. RLV. 321, 332
(2005) (commenting that the reiusal of the government to release frozen assets of Holy
Land Foundation to another relief group obstructed legitimate Muslim giving).
32. ACLU REPORT. supra note 24, at 16. One former Department of Treasury
official criticized the governmnent's approach: "By making people paranoid about
giving, we are not making the problem [of terrorism] any better. This is essentially the
rub. [Going after terrorism financing] is an important thing to do, but at the same time
we know that there has been a drop-oil in giving, and that's exactly the wvrong way to do
this. We want more money going to the right places." Id. at 127.
33. Anti-Money Laundering Hearing, supra note 29, at 51 (testimony of Daniel L.
Glaser, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Treasury).
2013] 6 9
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communities."34 Although he suggested that there are limits on
what government can do to assist the charitable sector, he
implied that the charitable sector must self-regulate, helping
vigilantly to protect against institutional risks associated with
unintentionally funding terrorism. 1
During the same congressional hearing, some nonprofit
representatives painted the charitable sector and Muslim
Americans as frustrated and victimized by the government. They
launched criticisms at the Treasury, its regulatory measures, and
its implementation of its various domestic and international
policies and programs. They railed at the lack of due process
available to charities whose funds are frozen by Treasury's Office
of Foreign Assets Control." These critics called upon President
Obama and Congress to take steps to reassess antiterrorism laws
and governmental counter-terrorism tactics that undermine
treasured American values and human rights and chill
legitimate religious, humanitarian, and advocacy activities.
Matthew Levitt, Director for the Stein Program on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence at the Washington Institute
for Near East Policy, took a more conciliatory approach at the
hearing. As if partly to address Mr. Glaser's testimony, he first
commented that intelligence reports from the US Department
of Justice, the Financial Action Task Force (the thirty-four-
member multilateral body setting global standards for anti-
money laundering and counterterrorism financing), and British
authorities reveal that donor lists outlive US-based Islamic
charities that have been terminated. Such long-lived lists then
can be shuttled surreptitiously to newly created charities that
terrorists use to provide them both logistical and financial
support." He also indicated that some international Islamic
charities responded to governmental crackdowns by
34. Id. at 59-63.
35. There are limitations inherent in self-regulation, including restrictions on
what due diligence and monitoring of donors and grantees can uncover or protect
against, especially dangers presented by surreptitious terrorist figures.
36. See, e.g., Anti-Aoney Laundering Hearing, supra note 29, at 65 (testimony of Kay
Guinane, Program Dir., Charity & Sec. Network); see also id. at 39 (written statement of
Michael German, Policy Counsel, ACLU).
37. Id., at 93 (testimony of Matthew Levitt, Dir. for the Stein Program on
CountLerLerrorism & Intelligence at the Wash. Inst. for Near E. Pol'y, referencing also
Glenn R. Simpson, Islamic Charities Draw More ScrutinY, AVALL ST. J., Feb. 23. 2008, at
A4).
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decentralizing and localizing their financing operations of
terrorists and by shifting their funding from investments in
specific programs to large infrastructure projects that can
conceal the transfers of significant funds intra-nationally and
trans-nationally.38 Furthermore, Dr. Levitt repeated that dual
militant-social welfare organizations, operating under a veil of
legitimacy, continue to produce significant grassroots popular
and financial support by, "establishing an unarmed
infrastructure [s] that provide [] essential [humanitarian]
services" to vulnerable widows, orphans, families of martyrs, and
others while laundering and transferring funds for terrorist
activities.3 And, as I previously have warned,40 he went to great
length to decry the unintended, damaging impact that the US
laws and the methods of their enforcement had on charitable
giving.41 In other words, Dr. Levitt indicated both government
and the nonprofit sector have a responsibility to act cautiously,
proceed in good faith with outreach efforts, and cooperate with
one another.
In sum, during the first decade of the twenty-first century,
counterterrorism laws and policies and their enforcement
produced a powerful backlash. There were real, recognized
domestic consequences-suggested by some as disproportionate
to their benefits4 2-for Muslim Americans and US-based Islamic
charities. There were also global impacts. Many needy Muslims
abroad went without support and humanitarian aid from their
American brethren. The effects were transformative for Muslim
Americans and Islamic believers around the world.
38. Id. at 95.
39. Id. at 95-96 (quoting Erik A. Claessen, S. WE. T. and BLOOD: Essential Serices
in the Battle Between Insurgents and Counterinsurgents, MIL. REV. (2007).
40. See Crinmm, High Alert. supra note 25, at 1402-03; Crimin. Moral Hazards of
Financing Aleasures, supra note 22, at 578.
41. Anti-Woney Laundering Hearing, supra note 29, at 24-26 (statement of Matthew
Levitt, Dir. for the Stein Program on C ounttlterrorism & Intelligence at the Wash. Inst.
for Near E. Policy).
42. See id. at 22-23 (statement of Kay Guinane, Program Dir, Charity & Sec.
Network); Nathan Vardi, Al Qaedas New Business MWodel, FORBES. Mar. 1, 2010. at 64: see
generally. Danicl J. Mitchell, Fighting Terror and Defending Freedom: The Role of Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 25 PACE L. REV. 219 (2005).
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE SETTING-IN THE INFANCY OF
THE SECOND DECADE OF THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
In the infancy of the second decade of the twenty-first
century, various factors are already contributing to potential
stimuli for new domestic Islamic-socio-political activism to
address the damages wrought during the first decade of this
century.
A. Demographics
"Globalization has its own demographic pattern-a rapid
acceleration of the movement [and growth] of people from
rural areas . . . to [and in] urban areas . . . ." As the second
decade of the twenty-first century begins, The Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life ("The Pew Forum") projects that this
demographic pattern will hold true with respect to the
continually growing number of Islamic believers. 44 Studies by
The Pew Forum estimated that the Islamic population
worldwide numbered 1.57 billion in 2009,45 1.6 billion in 2010, 6
and is forecast to reach 2.2 billion Muslims worldwide by 2030.4
Indeed, the expectation is that most Muslims, who in 2009
represented 23% percent of the world population 48 and may
make up 26.4% of the world's 2030 total population, will live
largely in cities in the Asia-Pacific region (60%) and the Middle
East and North Africa (20%).4"1 And, as discussed below in Part
43. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 13.
44. PLw FORUM ON RELIGION & Pup. LIFE. THE FUTURE OF THE GLOBAL MUSLIM
POPUTATION: PROJECTIONS FOR 2010-2030 (2011) [hereinafter PEW FORUNI,
PROJECTIONS], available at http:,// wy.pewforurn.org/The-Future-of-the-Global-
Muslim-Population.aspx: see also Linking Population, Poverty and Development, UN
POPUTATION FUND (UNIFIPA), http:,//mT.unfpa.org/pds/trends.htrn (last visited Mar.
4 2012).
45. PLw FORUM, PROJECTIONS, supra note 44. at 7.
46. Id., at 13. Several factors contribute to these expectations: Muslims' high
fertility rates, improved health and economic conditions, declining infant and child
mortality ratcs, and longer life expectancies. Id.
47. Id.
48. See PEw FORUM ON RELIGION & PuB. LIFE, MAPPING THE GLOBAL MUSLIM
POPuLATION 1 (2009) [hereinafter PLw FORUM, MAPPING], available at
http://wy .pewvforurn.org/newassets/images/reports/rmuslimpopulation/
inuslimpopulation.
49. Id.; see also Thomas, supra note 1. at 93-95. In absolute numbers, the Muslim
population in the United States is expected to outnumber Muslims in rnost European
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III, the numerous poor living in these urban communities will
likely need social welfare assistance.
With respect to the United States, a definitive population
count of Muslim Americans has proved elusive-estimated by
varying sources at 2.35 million to 7 million.?0 Therefore, it is
difficult to project their anticipated number in 2030.
Nonetheless, based on census figures and other data, The Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press ("Pew Research
Center") in 2011 estimated there now are 2.75 million Muslim
Americans in the United States.5' And The Pew Forum predicts
that the Muslim American population will more than double
before 2030, largely as a result of "higher than average" fertility
and immigration,52 possibly reaching 6.2 million." For this
growing population of both native-born and foreign-born
Muslim Americans who, in future years, choose to adhere to
Islamic beliefs and practices, the obligation and desire to give
countries. Id. at 20-21. Only Russia and France are expected to have larger Muslim
populations. Id. at 20.
50. See CHICAGO COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS, STRENGTHENING AMERICA: THE
CTIC AND POLITICAL INTEGRATION OF MUSiIM AMERICANS 23 (2007) [hereinafter
STRENGTHENING, AMERICA]: PEw RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS: MIDDLE CLASS
AND MOSTLY MAINSTREAM 10, 13 (2007) [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM
AMERICANS MIDDLE CLASS]. One reason for the difficulty in accurately estimating the
number of Muslim-Aincricans is that ncither the Census Burcau nor the US Citizenship
and Immigration Services collects information on religious affiliation. See
STRENGTHENING AMERICA, supra, at 24. Another reason is that studies have relied on
telephone calls to households that have landline service. See PEw RESEARCH CTR.,
MUS IM AMERICANS MIDDLE CLASS, supra at 19. There has been no means to include in
the studies those households that have no telephone service or only cell phone service,
which includes an estimated 13.5% of the public. Id. Finally, language skills of Muslims
have proved challenging for researchers. See id. at 12-13. The 2.35 million estimate is
that of the Pcw Research (enter. Id. at 10. The seven million estimate is the result of a
2001 Survey by the Hartford Institute for Religious Research. See id. at 13.
51 . PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUS sI M AMERICANS: NO SIGNS OF GROWH IN
ALIENATION OR SUPPORT FOR EXTREFMISM 20 (2011) [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CTR.,
MUSLIM AMERICANS]. available at http://www.peopl-press.org/2011/08/30/muslim-
americans-no-signs-of-groth-i n-alienation-or-support-for-extremism.
52. PEW FORUM, PROJECTIONS, supra note 44. at 52.
53. Many Muslim Americans currently live in Cities, such as Detroit and Dearborn,
Michigan; Toledo, Ohio; Minneapolis, Minnesota; and there is no reason to believe
that in future years this demographic composition will diverge from globalization's
"own demographic pattern" of urban residence. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
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zakat and sadaqa54 to the neediest Muslims, considered generally
those abroad,5 will not recede.
While Muslim Americans are not a singular, monolithic
community, immigrants feature prominently. Approximately
sixty-three percent of Muslim Americans were born abroad,
while thirty-seven percent of Muslim Americans are native-
born.6 Of those born overseas, a vast majority is first generation
immigrant or second generation American.5 Forty percent of
Muslim Americans immigrated to the United States from
seventy-seven countries during the past decade.Ss The largest
proportion of Muslim American immigrants (forty-one percent)
arrived from Arab countries of the Middle East and North
Africa,M' and slightly more than one-quarter (twenty-six percent)
54. KHALTIJASSEMM, ISLAMIC PERSPECTIT ON CHARITY 25 (2006) (suggesting that
"if each of America's estimated six million Muslims were to donate at the rate of the
average American, their total giving would exceed US$5.3 billion annually").
Nonetheless, it is impossible to determine whether Muslim Americans donate at the
average rate of all Americans, or to rely upon a population estimate of 6 million
Muslim Americans for such calculation. See supra note 50 and accompanying text
(commlenting on varying estimates as to the number of Muslim Americans living in the
United States between 2001 and 2011).
55. See Crimm, Woral Hazards of Finac ing Measures, supra note 22, at 582 n. 16,
593-94 (indicating that Muslims widely believe that the world's neediest Muslims
should be the recipients of zakat and anecdotal evidence indicates they live in foreign
countries).
56. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MNUSIM AMERICANS, supra note 51, at 13.
57. Id. This compares with sixty-five percent who were first generation immigrants
and twenty-one percent who were second generation immigrants as reported in 2007.
Cf PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS MIDDLE CASs, supra note 50, at 15.
58. PLw RLSEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 51, at 14; see also, ISLAM
AND DEMOCRACY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Daniel Brumberg et al. eds., 2003). According
to an earlier report from the Pew Research Center, Muslim American immigrants were
from at least sixt -eight different countries. PEw RLSLARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMLRICANS
MIDDLE CLASs, supra note 50, at 15.
59. PEW REStARCH CTR., MULIM AMERICANS, supra note 51, at 14. In 2007, more
than thirty-seven percent arrived from the "Arab region" and a large proportion from
South Asia. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUS LIM AMERICANS MIDDiL CLASs, supra note 50, at
15. The "Arab region" is based on a UNDP classification, which defines the region as
encompassing twenty-two Middle Eastern and North African countries. Id. The US
Department of State also published demographic information on Muslirn-Americans,
with estimates fairly similar to those of the Pew Research Center survey. Mluslim Life in
America: Demographic Facts. U.S. OFFICL OFINT'L INFO. PROGRAMS, U.S. DLP'T OF STATL,
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/muslirnlife/demograp.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2007). By comparison, the Council on Anrican-Islamic Relations ("CAIR") estimated
that in 2005, twenty-six percent of Muslim American immigrants were from Arab states.
Western Muim Winorities: Integration and Disenfranchisement, CAIR,
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emigrated from the South Asian region.O Reflective of this 2011
profile, the largest percentage of foreign-born Muslim
Americans who emigrated from one country came from Pakistan
(nine percent) while eighteen percent of them-three percent
from each country-arrived from Iran, the Palestinian
territories, Bangladesh, Yemen, Jordan, and Iraq.6' And it is
these immigration patterns, along with education and income
levels, which suggest numerous Muslim Americans direct or
attempt to transmit substantial amounts of zakat and sadaqa to
their countries of origin.62
Because the financial security and education of Muslim
Americans impact their ability to give charity, it is important that
many perceive themselves as middle-class. And, according to the
Pew Research Center, there is a connection between education
and the perception of financial well-being. 6 Those who are
college graduates are more satisfied with their financial
condition. 64 Forty-six percent view their personal financial
situations to be good or excellent." Indeed, fourteen percent of
http:/,/vwy.cair.corn/Portals/()/pdf/policy bulletin Integration in theWest.pdf
(last visited Feb. 10, 2013).
The American Muslim Council reports that forty-two percent of all Muslims are
Arican-Americans, twenty-four percent are of South Asian origin, and twelve percent
are of Aiab origin. See Abdul Malik Mujahid. Muslims in America: Profile ALLIED MEDIA
CORP., http://www.allied-media.com/AM/AM-profile.htm (2010) (suggesting that the
large number of Arican-American Muslims is partly attributable to prisoners who
convert to Islam while incarcerated).
60. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 51, at 14.
61. Id. This compares with data from 2007 indicating that Muslim Americans had
emigrated largely from Iran (twelve percent) and Pakistan (twelve percent), and nearly
one-quarter are from India (seven percent), Iraq (four percent), Lebanon (six
percent), and Ycmen (six percent) Combined. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS
MIDDLE ( LASS, supra note 50. at 15.
62. See Crimm, Charitable Giving Dilemma, supra note 18, at 384.
63. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS, supra note 51, at 39. As a whole, the
education lvels of Muslim Americans are proportionately similar to those of the
general American population. Id. at 17.
64. Id. at 39 (reporting that college graduates perceive their financial comfort as
mostly excellent or good).
65. Id. This source expands on a prior survey, which merely reported that Muslim
Americans mostly think of themselves as doing well financially. See PEw RLSEARCH CTR.,
MUSLIM AMERICANS MIDDLE CLASS, supra note 50, at 19 (reporting that forty-two
percent of Muslim Americans report "good" or "excellent" satisfaction wvith their
financial situation as). An Illinois study reports Muslims living in that statc to have an
average annual household income of USS53,500. The average Arab Muslim family
income is the highest at US$69,000, while African-American Muslim families earn the
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Muslim Americans report household income of at least
USS100,000, and forty percent report household income
between US$30,000 and USS100,000.66 The US financial crisis
that began in 2008 has taken its toll, however, on Muslim
Americans, particularly youths. Forty-five percent of all Muslim
Americans report total annual household income as less than
US$30,000. 67 Twenty-nine percent of Muslim Americans are
underemployed, with underemployment particularly prevalent
among younger Muslim adults.68 So, younger Muslim Americans
appear generally to be an economically vulnerable group.
Nonetheless, it appears that "a very high percentage (twenty-six
percent) . . . [of Muslim Americans, presumably largely
youths] are currently enrolled in college or university classes."('
Their education achievements ultimately will affect their
employment prospects, their income levels, and their ability to
give significant amounts of zakat and sadaqa.
Religious beliefs and practices, as well as religiosity, also
affect charitable giving and, as discussed in Parts II.C. and III
below, may influence the likelihood that particular Muslim
Americans or groups may be subjected to government
surveillance. Like Americans of Christian faiths, religion is "very
important" to nearly seventy percent of Muslim Americans. 70
Most Muslim Americans hold traditional Islamic beliefs. Ninety-
six percent say they believe in God, ninety-six percent in the
Prophet Mohammad, ninety-two percent in a future Day of
Judgment, and ninety percent in angels. 71 Vhile many Muslim
Americans believe in these religious tenets-fifty percent believe
that the Qur'an should be read literally-only one-third believe
that "there is only one true way to interpret the [broader]
least at US$32,000 per year. See Abdul Malik Mujahid, MAuslins in Aerica: Profile,
AIiFD MEDIA CORP. (2010), http://www.allied-media.corn/AM/AM-proile.htm.
66. PLw RLSLARCH CTR., MUSLIMAMERICANS, supra note 51, at 17 (comparing the
fourteen percent of Muslim households wvith income of US$100,000 to sixteen percent
of the general population).
67. Id. at 15. Only twelve percent of Muslim Americans are fifty-five years or older.
68. Id. at 18. Thirty-seven percent of Muslim Americans under thirty years old are
underemployed, compared with twenty-eight of those thirty to thirty-nine years old,
twenty-three percent of those forty to fifty-four years old, and fourteen percent of
Muslim Americans fifty-ive and older. Id.
69. Id. at 17.
70. Id. at 25.
71. Id. at 28.
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teachings of Islam" and nearly two-thirds believe that there is
"more than one way" to do sO.72 Sixty-one percent of Muslim
American immigrants and approximately fifty-one percent of
native-born Muslim Americans believe there is "more than one
true way" to interpret the teachings of Islam.7 I Two-thirds of
Muslim Americans pray daily, while one-third pray occasionally
or do not pray.74 Fifty percent of Muslim Americans under thirty
years of age are religiously observant, are more accepting of
Islamic fundamentalism, and attend mosque services at least
weekly. a Also, the cohort of native-born Muslim Americans is
more likely than immigrants to attend mosque services weekly.7 6
Moreover, most Muslim Americans-sixty-three percent-see no
conflict in being a devout Muslim and living in US modern
society.
Demographics and their relationship with globalization are
just part of the variety of factors that may stimulate new
domestic Islamic-socio-political activism as the second decade of
the twenty-first century proceeds. Also important will be the
confluence of technology, religion, and politics.
B. Blending Technology, Religion, and Politics as Facets of
Globalization
As the technology age speeds ahead, it provides
decentralized opportunities to create, transfer, and access
information. It enables the rapid electronic movement of
currency globally and participation in new payment methods.
And it facilitates the mobility of humans and their property,
including money, via jets, bullet trains, and other efficient
72. PLW RLSEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMLRICANS: MIDDLL CLASS, supra note 50, at 23.
73. PEW RESEARCH CTR., NI i1M AMERICANS, supra note 51, at 28.
74. Id. at 23.
75. PLw RLSEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMERICANS MIDDLL CLASS, supra note 50, at 6
(comparing the religious beliefs and practices of Muslims under the age of thirty to
those of believers thirty years and older, thirty-five percent of whorn are religiously
observant and attend mosque services weekly).
76. Id. at 24.
77. PLW RLSEARCH CTR., MUSLIM AMLRICANS, supra note 51, at 36. Fifty-six percent
of Muslin Americans attach importance to assimilating into American society after
immigrating to the United States. Id. at 33. Nonetheless, twenty percent indicate
Muslin Americans should not adopt American customs and way of life after
immnigraing to the United States. and [hirty-one perceive a conflict in being a devout
Islamic believer and living in US modern society. Id. at 33, 36.
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modes of transportation. Numerous informational technology
resources, including cell phones, Twitter, MySpace, Facebook,
and other social networking media, allow interactive dialogues
that are used increasingly around the world to connect people.
For example, Al Qaeda's Yemen branch "has proved especially
adept at disseminating teachings and commentary through
several different social media networks." 8And before Osama
bin Laden was killed in Pakistan, he was a "pioneer in
employing the Internet to organize operations, raise funds and
indoctrinate followers."7
Just as it was for Osama bin Laden, technology as a
financing tool has been a friend to other terrorists, terrorist
groups, and dual militant-social welfare organizations.80 Such
terrorist and dual militant-social welfare groups have exploited
certain technologies to their advantages. But in combating
terrorist financing, a priority of the US government since 9/11,
cooperating federal agencies now are employing new
technologically-based strategies in attempts to eliminate funding
from reaching terrorist organizations. 81 With statistics indicating
a drop in prosecutions of Muslim Americans for support of
terrorism and a significant reduction in the amounts of money
allegedly involved in terrorist financing cases," successes are
now being trumpeted. For instance, national news media
reported the dissolution of KindHearts for Charitable
78. Jeffrey Gettleman, Somalia's Insurgents Enbrace Twitter as a Weapon, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 15, 2011, at A10.
79. Max Boot, Editorial, After Bin Laden, BALTIMORL SUN, May 4, 2011. at A21.
80. For a long time, Harnas derived much of its financial support from a network
of charitable organizations. Now it is considerably more reliant on Iran. See Countering
Terrorist Financing: Progress and Priorities, Hearing Before the Subcomin. on Crine &
Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the judiciary, 112th Cong. 8-9 (2011) [hereinafter
Counter Terrorist Financing Hearing] (testimony of Daniel L. Glaser, Deputy Assistant
Sec'y, Dep't of Treasury).
81. Within the United States, the Department of Treasury, Department of justice,
Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, Central Intelligence Agency,
and Federal Bureau of lInvestigation have worked together to counter terrorist
financing. See id. at 1-4 (testimony of Ralph S. Boelter, Acting Assistant Dir.
Counterterrorism Div., Fed. Bureau of Investigation); see also id. at 1 (testimony of Lisa
0. Monaco, Assistant At'y Gen., Dep't of Justice); id. at 1-3 (testimony of Daniel L.
Glaser, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Treasury).
82. See CHARLLS KURZNLAN, MUSLIM-AMERICAN TLRRORISM IN THE DECADE SINCE
9/11, at 6 (2012) (documenting the lower amounts of money involved in terrorist
financing cases since 9/11).
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Humanitarian Development in Toledo, Ohio on January 9,
2012. Its termination resulted from the government financially
starving the charity by freezing its assets after its purported
support of Hamas.A According to Daniel L. Glaser, in stark
contrast to several years ago, 4 "the U.S. . . . [is] no longer
fertile ground for terrorist fundraising.", Nonetheless, the US
Department of Treasury appears skeptical. It is concerned that
the emergence of new payment methods and technologies, such
as prepaid cards, mobile payments, and Internet fund transfers,
although sufficiently transparent to be susceptible to monitoring
by the US government and other global antiterrorist authorities
cooperating with the United States, 86 realistically "can . . .
create vulnerabilities if these payment tools are not adequately
covered by anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist
financing regulations."87
The same technology that enables transfers of huge sums of
money also can be used effectively and inexpensively to
disseminate ideas. Small groups of poorly funded US Islamic
liberal reformers, such as the nonprofit entity American Islamic
Forum for Democracy, employ the Internet to target Muslim
Americans in efforts to convince them to be more religiously
moderate, tolerant, and open-minded.8 8 Some progressive US
Islamic groups also use the Internet to promote attention
globally to moderate Islamic values, project intolerance for
83. See, e.g., Charity Linked to lamas Disbands, WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2012. at A2.
84. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text.
85. See Countering Terrorist Financing Hearing, supra note 80, at 2 (testimony of
Daniel L. Glaser, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Treasury) (stating that the
Government "remain [s] vigilant against a [possible] resurgence of this activity").
86. The Financial Action Task Force ("FATF"), FATF-style regional bodies, the
group of G-20 ministries, and other international groups have worked to combat global
terrorist financing. See id. at 4-5; see generally Crirnm, Moral Hazards of Financing
Measures, supra note 22, at 603-12. Providers of prepaid access are required by law to
register with the Department of Treasury, Financial Crines Enforcement Network
bureau, and certain foreign authorities as money service businesses, which through
disclosures permit authorities to track transfers. See also Countering Terrorist Financing
Hearing, supra note 80, at 7 (testimony of Daniel L. Glaser, Deputy Assistant Sec'y,
Dep't of Treasury).
87. Countering Terrorist Financing Hearing, supra note 80, at 7 (testimony of Daniel
L. Glaser, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Dep't of Trcasury).
88. See Munro, supra note 15, at 2-3.
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violence, and criticize certain components of US pre- and post-
9/11 domestic and foreign policies.89
While the burgeoning use of the Internet by such moderate
Islamic believers enables them to reach a broad domestic and
international audience, it is countered by television and Internet
imams who preach adherence to, and the revival of, a more
fundamentalist form of Islam.o And as compared to the reform
movement, the network of US Islamic fundamentalists is
stronger, more coalesced, better funded, larger, and more
dominant.9 This US Islamic revivalist network is reported to be
"centered in the Islamic Society of North America ["ISNA"] and
its associated groups, mosques, ethnic subgroups, university
student associations, overseas supporters, and lobbying groups
that have organized to expand the domestic political clout of
immigrant Muslim groups, chiefly Arabs."92 Through the North
American Islamic Trust, the majority of the approximately 1,200
US mosques are owned by, or affiliated and closely aligned with,
ISNA and other Islamic groups that share a common parent
organization."
Thus, in the context of globalization as aided by the
Internet, religion has become not only an important national
actor, but also a transnational force with which to be reckoned.
Some Muslims emphasize that such a position for Islam offers
important opportunities for national changes and:
[F]or international cooperation in relation to various issues,
including social development and human rights, as well as
conflict resolution and peace building . . . . [Therefore
globalization can] enhance chances of international
cooperation to resolve a range of economic, developmental,
social, political, environmental, gender and human rights
concerns and injustices . . . [and to] offer unprecedented
opportunities for collective efforts involving both states and
89. See id. at 2.
90. See id. at 3.
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1.
93. See id. at 3 (reporting the common parent to be the Muslim Students
Association forted nearly forty years ago by supporters of "the most influential Islamist
revivalist political movement, the Muslim Brotherhood").
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non-state actors, including religious ones . . . . [that]
participate in and are affected by globalisation.94
It is clear that dual religious-political actors, including foreign
Islamist movements and Islamist parties, have seized these
opportunities and have claimed a place in a global world.
Two situations are perfect illustrations. The first involves
the Arab Spring uprisings, such as those in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt,
and Syria. In these countries, Islamic non-state protestors
harnessed a variety of communicative technologies in attempts
to mobilize the masses and exert pressures to bring about
democratic changes within repressive Muslim regimes and
create newly defined identities for the people. The second
example is the reassertion of a sophisticated and rhetorically
skilled Islamic political actor, the Muslim Brotherhood, into the
world's political arena. In the January 2012 Egyptian Parliament
elections, the Muslim Brotherhood received almost a majority
(forty-seven percent) of the seats and now leads Parliament,95
and in June 2012, the Muslim Brotherhood candidate,
Mohammed Morsi, became Egypt's president.96 Both the Arab
Spring revolts and the Muslim Brotherhood's assumption of
political force and power in Egypt involved the domestic affairs
of Middle East countries. Nonetheless, indicative of
simultaneous polarities that depict globalization, these events
became international affairs. The Arab Spring activism led some
Western liberal democracies in 2011 to send troops and advisors,
materials, and financial support to assist the protestors-at least
with respect to Libya. And following in the Arab Spring's activist
and political wake, several US citizens made and released the
incendiary, anti-Muslim YouTube video, "Innocence of
Muslims," in September 2012, provoking immediate violent
Islamic anti-American activism in Egypt (as well as other
countries), and testing the relations between Egypt and the
United States. The development and evolution of the Muslim
Brotherhood's political power caused world leaders, such as US
94. Haynes, supra note 8, at 136-37.
95. David D. Kirkpatrick, In Egyptian Hard-Liner's Surge, New Worries for the Muslim
Brotherhood, N.Y. TIEwS, Apr. 1, 2012, at A4 [hereinafter Kirkpatrick, In Egyptian Hard-
Liner's Surge]; Kirkpatrick, Islamists Win, supra note 16.
96. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Egipts Ne Leader Takes Oath, Promising to Wiork for
Release ofJ ailed Terrorist, NX. TIMS, june 30, 2012, at A8.
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President Barack Obama, to reassess their countries' foreign
policies and foreign aid. These leaders voiced a host of
concerns, including worries that Egypt may become more
religiously conservative and that fundamentalist religiosity might
become deeply integrated into Egypt's political power
structure. 7
Such widely reported events and their polarizing features
induced by globalism have caused some wariness of globalism
among Muslims and concerns of potential backlash. Some point
to President Obama and other leaders' reactions, considering
their objectives to be inherently undesirable attempts to further
the spread of western, particularly US, capitalism and culture
with the goal of making the West rich at the expense of
impoverished non-western countries. " Other Muslims feel
threatened directly and personally. Certain Islamic leaders fear
that their own grip on internal governance may be
compromised by, and potentially lost to, protestors with access
to globally connective technology. Indeed, as a mechanism to
protect authority structures, some governments in Muslim-
majority (and other) countries, such as Egypt and Syria, have
attempted to censor parts of the Internet or block Twitter
messages deemed illegal.9 Still others, citing such concerns as
the ability of Muslim youth to "construct new, radical identities
97. See, e.g., Lara Jakes, Washington Casts Wa Eye at Muslim Brotherhood. PEW
FORUM ON RELIGION & PUB. LIFE (Jan. 28, 2013), http:,// wy.pewforun.org/Religion-
News/Washington-casts-wary-cye-at-Muslim-Brotherhood.aspx: Steven Lee Myers,
Emergency Aid to Egypt Encounters an Objection, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29. 2012, at All; David
K. Kirkpatrick & Steven Elnlanger, Egyptian Leader Spells Out Termsfor V. S.-Arab Ties, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 23, 2012, at Al; Helene Cooper & Mark Landler, Spotlight is on Libya. but
Bigger Challenge for Wte House Ma Lie in Egypt, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, at A14; Scott
Shane, As Islam.s Gain InfJuence, Washington Reassesses 1Who Its friends Are, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2012, at A7: Aya Batrawy, Egypt Elections 2012: Islamists Secure 75 Percent of
Parliament, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 21, 2012. 11:06 AMI)
http:,//ww.huffingtonpost.con/2012/01/21/egypt-elections-2012-
islamists n 1220801.htmin (last visited Dec. 4 2012); Kirkpatrick, Islamists Win, supra
note 16; David D. Kirkpatrick & Steven Lee Myers, Overtures to Egypt's Islamists Reverse
Longtime U.S. Policy, N.Y. TIMESJan. 4, 2012, at Al.
98. Haynes, supra note 8, at 136. This concern is not without historical basis, as
powerful colonialists, inperialists, and post-Cold War forces freely exercised their
political muscle in previous decades.
99. See, e.g., Doyle McManus, Foreign Aid that Matters: Call It Internet Freedom 2.0
The US.. Needs To Kee'p FundingIt L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18. 2011, at A30; SoImini Sengupta,
Whean Twitte, Blocks Tw , It's Ou trage, N.Y. TIMESJan. 28, 2012, at Al.
ISLAMIC SOCIO-POLITICAL ACTIISM 6
by joining a virtual ummah, or global Islamic community,"n)oo or
the capability of terrorist groups and dual militant-social welfare
organizations like Hamas to manipulate vulnerable people 01
fear conceivably harmful impacts of the integration of
technologies, religion, and politics in the post-modern
globalized world.
Current technologies, whether employed as a
communication or a financing tool, can benefit, as well as create
challenges for, governmental and non-governmental actors. And
the connectivity brought by these technologies makes it virtually
impossible for actors to maintain an iron sheath between Islam
and politics. As a result, globalization may simultaneously
stimulate trust and distrust among people and nations and lead
to intensified pressures for Muslims, including Muslim
Americans, to engage further in Islamic-socio-political activism.
C. Domestic Monitoring of Muslim Americans
In the United States, the balance of trust and distrust
between Muslim Americans and other Americans often appears
to be more highly weighted toward distrust. In attempts to
detect radical Islamists and "homegrown threats," federal and
local authorities have used technology: computerization,
miniaturization, digitization, satellite communications, fiber
optics, and the Internet. They have targeted and continue to
watch and listen to Muslim American citizens and leaders. Their
surveillance tactics have included the infiltration of mosques,
including those mosques whose imams are Islamic moderates.
Their policy and actions have disturbed a significant proportion
of Muslim Americans,102 the vast majority of whom oppose
violence against civilians and hold unfavorable views of Al
100. Thomas, supra note 1, at 99.
101. Gettleman, supra note 78, at A10 (detailing Somali insurgents' manipulation
of Twitter to engage vulnerable citizens and taunt encmics).
102. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSLITM AMERICANS, supra note 51, at 48 (noting the
majority of Muslim Americans believe that US antiterrorism policies target Muslim
Americans for increased surveillance and monitoring and thirty-cight percent find such
singling out bothersome). Moreover, more than forty percent of Muslim Americans,
and particularly those who are highly religious, report being singled out by law
enforcement officials or physically threatened or attacked in the twelve months
preceding the survey. Id. at 47-48.
2013] 23
624 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 36:600
Qaeda. 10s The government's conduct also has proved
controversial among the general public.104
A 2007 report from the New York Police Department
("NYPD"), Radicalization in the West: The Home grown Threat,
claimed that there is a determinable route from
"'prereadicalization' to 'jihadization,' driven by a
fundamentalist ideology 'proliferating in Western democracies
at a logarithmic rate."'1 5 This concern spurred the NYPD to
take contentious and aggressive measures. One was the showing
of an inflammatory video during police training in 2011-12 that
depicted most Islamic leaders as deceitful and suspect.100 A
second event discussed in the media was a "create and capture"
measure: the NYPD hired a spy to pretend to be a devout
Muslim, start an inflammatory conversation about jihad or
terrorism, and capture respondents' replies for the police. 0 7
Other routine measures included police trawling of Muslim
student organizations' websites or undercover attendance at
student organization lectures even if group members were not
suspected of wrongdoing.108
Citizens' safety and national security do need protection.
Yet, the Brennan Center for Justice reported last year that
multiple empirical studies show no link between "religiosity"
and "a propensity for terrorism."10 o Indeed, a recent British
study comments that a "well-established [Islamic] religious
identity actually protects against violent radicalization,"I'ol and a
103. Id. at 4-5.
104. See. e.g., id. at 48 (commenting on the general public's division on the
nattCr).
105. Michael Powell. With Vluslims, Using a Brush Far Too Broad. N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
31, 2012, at A18.
106. See Michael Powell, In Police Training, A Dark Film on US. Muslims N.Y. TIMFS,
Jan. 24, 2012, at Al. The New York Police Deparncnt's tactics sparked considerable
controversy, well documented by the media. See, e.g:, Letter to the Editor, Ray Kelly's
War. WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2012, at Al8; Joseph Goldstein, Kelly Defends Surveillance of
Muslmns, N.Y. TIMLS. Feb. 28. 2012, at A19; Michael Howard Saul & Scan Gardiner,
Can ddats Weigh NYPD's Tactics, W\ALL ST.J., Feb. 25, 2012, at A15.
107. See Editorial Opinion, Spying on Law-Abiding Vtuslims, N.Y. TIMLS, Feb. 10,
2013, at 10.
108. See id.; Al Baker & Kate Taylor, Mayor Defends Wonitoring O fMuslim Students on
Veb, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at AI8.
109. FAIZAPATEL, RETHINKING RADICALIZATION 3 (2011).
110. Id. at 10 (quoting TUYAL CHOUDHRYL. THL ROLL OF MUSLIM IDLNTITY
POLITICS IN RADICALISATION (A STUDY IN PROGRESS) 6 (2007)). Choudhurv's British
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2010 study by several US scholars similarly suggests that
heightened expressions of Islamic piety by Muslim Americans
does not signal a proclivity toward extremism.11 The Brennan
Center for Justice further claims that radicalization is complex
and "[iit is simply not possible to identify 'markers' of
radicalization . . . that allow early identification of would-be
terrorists."1 1 2 Despite this, such models that focus on Muslim
Americans' religious beliefs, expressive conduct, practices
continue to be used by enforcement authorities, and rigorously
supported by New York City's Mayor Michael Bloomberg and
other government officials," as important reasons to monitor
Muslim Americans. 114
Agreeing with the Brennan Center for Justice, a new
empirical study by the Triangle Center on Terrorism and
Homeland Security, released February 8, 2012, indicated that
there is no particular demographic profile of Muslim American
terrorism suspects." Moreover, the study noted that despite
warnings by the Department of Homeland Security and others
inculcating fear among the general public, there is significant
data to support a "relatively low level of radicalization among
Muslim-Americans." I 6 Homegrown terrorism plots by, and
indictments of, radicalized Muslim Americans for financially
supporting terrorism or associating with terrorist organizations,
simply have not materialized in substantial numbers in recent
years.11 In fact, they have declined since 2009, a point at which
an "unusually" high number were recorded. 118 In sum, the 2012
study has been said to find that homegrown terrorism by radical
study found that "a lack of religious literacy and education appears to be a conmmon
feature among those that are drawn to [terrorist] groups." Id. (quoting CHOL DHURY, at
6).
111. DAVID SCHANZLR ET AL.. ANTI-TLRROR LESSONS OF MLSLIM AMLRICANS 37
(2010), available at http://fds.duke.edu/db/attachment/ 1255.
112. PATEL, supra note 109, at 3. There is no single profile of the type of person
who becomes a terrorist. Id. at 8.
1 13. See supra note 106.
114. PATEL, supra note 109. at 3.
115. KURZMAL N, supra note 82. at 5.
1 16. Id. at 6.
117. Id. at 1-6.
118. Id. at 2 (Stating Lha[ ticre was a spike in Muslimt American Lerrorist plots in
2009).
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Muslim Americans is "a minuscule threat to public safety."119
Furthermore, although Islamist extremist organizations
"overseas continue to call for Muslim-Americans to engage in
violence[, . . . the number of Muslim-Americans who have
responded to these calls continues to be tiny."1 20 And, while
Muslims protested abroad in response to the YouTube video,
"Innocence of Muslims," Muslim Americans responded with
silence but without note from the same federal and local
authorities who have labeled them a threat. These are illustrative
of why "Muslim Americans [continue to be] understandably
alienated ... ." by local and federal authorities' misinformed
profiling models and intrusive monitoring approaches.'* 
III. POTENTL4L FUTURE IMPLIGA TIOAS FOR MUSLIM
AMERICANS 'PHILANTHROPY AND US-B4SED CLARITIES
"Nothing matters so much as what will come next, and what
will come next can only arrive if what is here now gets
overturned."1 2 2 So the first question is whether "what is here
now"-the disaffection of Muslim Americans, the chilling effect
on their philanthropy, the damage to US foreign relations, and
the blemished image of the United States-can be reversed.
While technology cannot provide the crystal ball, there are
factors that signal better outcomes will not necessarily come
soon.
Within the United States, it appears that the government's
pervasive "clash of civilizations" mentality on which it arguably
framed its post-Cold War foreign policy was incorporated in
2001 into its domestic policy toward Muslim Americans, where it
remains entrenched." The US government seems to be acting
119. Scott Shane, U.S. Muslims Rarely Seen in Terror Acts, Study Finds, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 8. 2012, at A10 (suinmarizing conclusions of report, KURZMAN, supra note 82).
120. KURZIAN, supra note 82. at 2.
121. PATI, supra note 108, at 3.
122. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at I1.
123. This is a reference to the concept presented in SAMUEL HuNTINGTON, THE
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996), which has been
attributed to a series of articles and a book by Bernard Lewis. See Michael Hirsh,
Bernard Lewis Revisited, WASH. MONTHLY (Nov. 2004). available at
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0411 .hirsh.html; see genelly M.
SHAHID ALAi, Bernard Lewis: Scholarship or Sophistrv?, in CHALLENGING THE NEW
ORIENTALSM: DISSENTING Essays ON THE "WAR AGAINST TERRORISM" 3-39 (2d cd.
2006).
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as the quintessential "Orientalist crouching tiger,"2 4 struggling
to dominate Muslim Americans, at least ideologically and
culturally, much as it was accused of in regard to its post-Cold
War foreign policy that purportedly sought to take over
underdeveloped and poor countries such as those in the Middle
East. This perception is reflected in many criticisms of the
Department of Treasury as the domineering bully that instigates
ill will, intentionally undermines Islamic values, and ignores
human rights. For instance, many in the Muslim American
community and charitable sector have rebuffed government
outreach and collaboration attempts as disappointing,
patronizing, unproductive, and inhumane efforts,'2 as well as
intolerable "soft power" counter-radicalization tactics.26 Many
also have perceived the means by which federal and local law
enforcement officials continue to aggressively monitor Muslim
Americans, even passive or moderate individuals, as a
psychological and ideological domination technique that
saddles the entire Muslim American population with
suspicion. 127 The documented low levels of radicalism and
largely non-existent markers of extremism (associations with
Muslim American organizations, Islamic beliefs, and such
religious practices as mosque attendance) fuel such criticisms.
The government's perception of a need to closely scrutinize
Muslim Americans' associations and activities unfortunately is
reinforced by a plausible concern about the strength of the
Islamic revivalist network, including its purported foothold in a
majority of US mosques. 18 With fifty percent of Muslim
Americans under thirty years old attending services weekly at
mosques, these Muslim Americans may be a cohort the
government most frequently watches, with or without reason.
According to the Pew Research Center, this same group of
Muslim Americans suffers disproportionately from
124. ALAMI, supra note 123, at 3-4 (referencing the idea that the US post-Cold War
foreign policy formulated its alleged conniving stance toward poor countries frol the
purportedly liberal, objective scholarship of Bernard Lewis, a political scientist).
125. See, e.g., Anti-Money Laundering Hearing, supra note 29, at 16-17 (testimony of
Kay Guinane, Program Dir., Charity & Sec. Network).
126. See Same jt I. RascoiT Ebishng Oj /i Islam'? T he L aw aid Srat ey of
Counter-Radic'a is, 64 STAN L_ REV- 12., 12-28 2012)
127. See sp, ralnotCs 108-13 and accoipanyingL ext.
128. Se supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
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underemployment"' and is more accepting of fundamentalism
than those who are olders,1o Generally, youth are technologically
adept and they may be susceptible to being influenced by the
Internet where they can easily access both revivalist Web sites
and create radical identities to participate in virtual mrnah.'3'
Moreover, as the Muslim American population continues to
grow rapidly through 2030, these concerns may be further
accentuated by a larger youth population. 13,2
Even Muslim American leaders of moderate Islamic
organizations at the forefront of the liberal, reformist Islamic
movement have expressed consternation. Some have suggested
the need to redouble outreach efforts because of growing
challenges from the vocal minority of Americans who see
Muslim Americans as suspect. The impact of Islamic
traditionalists is reflected in most Muslim Americans' own views
that support for Islamic extremism in the United States is on the
rise.13 And if Muslim Americans are finding it challenging to
dispel the voices and possible influence of the fundamentalist,
revivalist movement within their own communities, there is little
wonder as to why a considerable contingency of the US public,
stoked by government alerts and media reports, harbors
concerns. Surveys show that they perceive not only at least a "fair
amount" of support for extremism among Muslim Americans
but also such support is increasing rather than declining.3 4
But this disconcerting picture certainly is not the entire
one. Other factors hint that "what is here now" can be tackled
and remedied. Most Muslim Americans do not support
terrorism. Many are formerly from repressive countries from
which they sought relief, so likely they oppose
fundamentalism. 5 Furthermore, signaling a more moderate
129. See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
130. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
131. See spira note 90 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (describing the overall increase
in the world Muslini population).
133. PEW RESEARCH CTR., MUSI TM AMERICANS, supra note 51, at 5 (reporting that
sixty percent of Muslini Americans think there is rising Islamic radicalism in the United
States).
134. Id. at I (finding forty percent of the general public perceive at least a fair
amount of support for extremism by Muslim Americans). Some Muslim Americans
blamic their lcaders for not speaking out sufficiently against extremism. Id.
135. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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Islamic viewpoint and faith, nearly two-thirds of Muslim
Americans believe that Islamic teachings can be interpreted in
"more than one way,"" ,and most Muslim Americans see no
conflict between being devout Islamists and generally
assimilating into American life.17 At least one quarter of Muslim
Americans are college educated and another quarter is
attending college;" these individuals perhaps are learning to
make more measured and considered life choices and are
opening their minds to more worldly, informed future
evaluations. Many of these students will enter the ranks of the
significant number of Muslim Americans now employed in such
professions as engineering, medicine, and computer
programming.'s Moreover, as the US economic environment
improves, hopefully graduating students will join the many
Muslim Americans who now consider themselves middle class
and financially comfortable.1401 And as a whole, the disaffection,
if any, of such progressive, educated, employed, financially
secure individuals may be less acute than for other Muslim
Americans. Of course, that is not to say some of them are not
disenchanted with their treatment by federal and state
authorities or disgruntled with the government's domestic and
foreign policies. Yet, they may be in positions to offer
constructive and productive ways to overturn "what is here
now.
The plight of Muslims in other nations appears to remain
somewhat bleak, despite certain indications of recent changes
resulting from such events as the Arab Spring uprisings. There
are no clear signs that the US government intends to ease legal
restrictions that affect the flow of Muslim Americans' zakat and
sadaqa to needy Muslims abroad. While US-based Islamic
charities, now few in number, no longer appear to be exploited
by terrorists for fundraising purposes, the US government
remains on alert.141 But the number of Islamic believers abroad
136. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
138. PEw RLSLARCH (INTER, MUSLIM AMLRICANS, supra note 51, at 17.
139. See The GrowinglMuslim American Market, ALLILD MEDLIA (ORP..
http:,//vw.allied-media. com /AM (last visited Mar. 2, 2012) (basing its findings on a
Cornell University study).
140. See supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
141. See supra notes 87 and accompanying text.
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is rising, and is expected to continue spiraling.1 42 And globalism
is bringing a rapid movement of Muslims from rural areas to
cities, many of which are mired in poverty. 43 Current and future
populations of poor Muslims in these expansive and crowded
cities will need social welfare support. Where foreign
governments do not provide adequate services or attend to their
destitute, this responsibility can fall on legitimate civil society
organizations, but only if the foreign governments permit their
existence. Such humanitarian groups, however, may be unable
to provide sufficient aid to the needy population, and certainly
may be hampered by the absence of financial support from
Muslim Americans. So such "impoverished metropolises,"
unfortunately, can become fertile environments not only for
hiding terrorists but also for providing opportunities for dual
militant-social welfare groups to infiltrate communities to win
the hearts and minds of the poor. For example, in Cairo, Egypt:
Islamist extremism is contingent on locally specific
economic, social and political transformations that are
exploited by a minority of militant activists .... [They]
were able to capitalize on developments in very specific ways
that had little to do with the role of Islamic charitable giving
financing these groups. Specifically, the militant Islamic
Group found it possible to diffuse a particular form of
family-based Islamic norms through the establishment of a
dense network of unregulated private mosques that
provided a wide range of social services . . . . [Mi]any of
the social services in the poorest sections of Cairo are
underwritten by Islamist activists . . . .144
142. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
143. PEW FORUM, PROJFCTIONs, supra note 44, at 61; Thomas, supra note 1, at 93-
94.
144. Khalid Mustafa Medani, Informal Netivworks, Eco nomic Li elihoods and the Politics
of Social Welfare: Understanding the Political and Humanitarian Consequences of the War on
Terrorist Finance, 10 U.C.L.A.J. ISLAMIC & NEA1R E. L. 99, 134-35 (2011) (explaining that
"Islamist extremism is contingent on locally specific economic, social and political
transformations that are exploited by a minoriLty of militant activists ... far more
significant has becn the rolk of the density of small private [unregulated] mosques in
the [Cairo] neighborhoods. It is here that militant preachers deliver persuasive
serimons to the community and where young children and youth have are recruited via
both material as well as social incentives and the promise of both upward mobility and
an elevated social and political status.").
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So for years to come, globalism's natural demographic
pattern of urbanization and the economic and social situations
produced by it may well attract shrewd dual militant-social
welfare groups and terrorists. If so, the US government will be
challenged in its efforts to curtail the problematic influences of
these groups.
Moreover, in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood, described as a
"secretive, hierarchical once-militant group that became the
fountainhead of Islamist ideologies" 145 and as "virtually
invent[ing] political Islam," 146 has new political power. In
response to this new reality,147 the United States may be shifting
its foreign policy course.148 In so doing, it potentially may appear
hypocritical to some Muslim Americans-that is, Muslim
Americans may view as two-faced a change of attitude by the US
government that permits it to guardedly show some cautious
support for the Muslim Brotherhood while continuing its
decade-old imposition of restrictions on Muslim Americans'
ability to give zakat and sadaqa to US-based Islamic charities for
fear their contributions might become available to similar
groups to support terrorist activities. In defense of the foreign
policy alteration, a senior administration official commented
that the United States is in a bind: "It would be 'totally
impractical' not to engage with the Brotherhood 'because of
U.S. security and regional interests in Egypt . . . .'149 Some
Muslim Americans, however, may consider this response a lame
excuse. And their possible perception of hypocrisy may
mushroom, especially because the "emerging U.S. relationship
with the Brotherhood [signals only] a first step toward a pattern
that could take shape with the Islamist parties' coming to power
around the region in the aftermath of the uprisings of the Arab
145. David D. Kirkpatrick, Chaotic Start to Egypt's First Freely Democratically Elected
Parliament, N.Y. TIMFS,Jan. 24, 2012, at A4.
146. Kirkpatrick, Islanists Win, supra note 16, at As.
147. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
148. Shane, supra note 97; Kirkpatrick, In Egyptian Hard-Liner's Surge, supra note
95, at A4; Myers, supra note 97. Al1; Kirkpatrick & Englander, supra note 97. Al.
149. David D. Kirkpatrick & Steven Lee Myers, US. Reversal on Egyptian Islanists is
Historic Shift, INT'i HERALD TRIB., jan. 5, 2012, at 1.
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Spring. Islamists have taken important roles in Morocco, Libya,
Tunisia and Egypt in less than a year."Iso
Muslim Americans, their leaders, and the charitable sector,
however, may be able to harness such a shift in US foreign policy
to push US policymakers to rethink domestic policies and laws
that have alienated a significant number of Muslim Americans,
chilled their philanthropy, hurt US-based Islamic charities, and
reduced opportunities to win the hearts and minds of Muslims
abroad. To mobilize support, they might employ technologies,
including social networking, Change.org (the "go to" Internet
site for Web uprisings), and the like. In this regard, now may be
a crucial time to engage constructively and productively in
domestic Islamic-socio-political activism, calling upon, and
working with, the President and Congress. Together they could
reassess US counterterrorism policies, antiterrorism regulatory
measures, and the enforcement approaches that undermine
cherished American values and human rights, and chill
legitimate religious, humanitarian, and advocacy activities. Such
engagement by Muslim Americans may even lead to a greater
opportunity domestically and internationally. It might lead to
the "re-establish[ment of] Islamic values" and facilitate
enhanced stability and unity of groups, societies, and countries
confronted by the polarities and tensions of globalization's
forces.
CONTCL USION
The confluence of globalization's technology, Islam's
resurgence, and politics in this second decade of the twenty-first
century has various potential implications for Muslim
Americans' philanthropy, US-based Islamic charities, and
terrorist financing. While over time globalization can blur
territorial boundaries of countries and homogenize populations
and cultures, it also "turn [s] all 'friends' and 'enemies' into
competitors."' '5 A common belief is that competition can drive
better behaviors and performance by the competing actors. The
150. Id.; David D. Kirkpatrick, Keeper ofIslamic Flame Rises as Egp t' New Decisive
Voice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2012, at Al; Libya 1slamists Fr Political Pary, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2012, available at http: /www.nytilnes.con/2012/0 03/world/africa/libya-
islami ts-forill-political-party.htiiil.
151. FRIEDMAN, supra note 8, at 12 (internal quotations added).
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verdict remains open with respect to the various governmental
and non-governmental actors involved in the conundrums
presented in this Article. Both the US government and Muslim
Americans need to seize this decade's opportunities to decidedly
improve the quality of their collective efforts, renegotiate their
tattered relationship, and unequivocally enhance the civil,
human, and political rights of Islamic believers.
